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Abstract. We describe a graph visualization tool for visualizing Java
bytecode. Our tool, which we call J-Viz, visualizes connected directed
graphs according to a canonical node ordering, which we call the sibling-
first recursive (SFR) numbering. The particular graphs we consider are
derived from applying Shiver’s k-CFA framework to Java bytecode, and
our visualizer includes helpful links between the nodes of an input graph
and the Java bytecode that produced it, as well as a decompiled version
of that Java bytecode. We show through several case studies that the
canonical drawing paradigm used in J-Viz is effective for identifying
potential security vulnerabilities and repeated use of the same code in
Java applications.
1 Introduction
The Space/Time Analysis for Cybersecurity (STAC) program [10] at the
U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) aims to develop
new program analysis techniques and tools for identifying vulnerabilities related
to the space and time resource usage behavior of algorithms, and specifically
to vulnerabilities based on algorithmic complexity and side channel attacks.
STAC seeks to enable security analysts to identify algorithmic resource usage
vulnerabilities in software to support a methodical search for them in the
software upon which the U.S. government, military, and economy depend [10].
Our Contributions. In this paper, we describe a tool, the JVM abstractng
abstract machine (Jaam) Visualizer, or “J-Viz” for short, which is intended for
use by security analysts to perform such searches through the exploration of
graphs derived from Java bytecode. We are not attempting to solve the problem
of identifying software algorithmic complexity attacks in a completely automated
way, but instead we are providing a means for doing semi-automated analysis
that increases the efficiency of a human analyst. The workflow for our tool
involves taking a given program, specified in Java bytecode, and constructing
a control-flow graph of the possible execution paths for this software, using a
framework known as control flow analysis (CFA) [22]. Our tool then provides
a human analyst with an interactive view of this graph, including heuristics for
aiding the identification of which parts of the provided program seem suspicious.
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One of the main components of our J-Viz tool involves visualizing control-flow
graphs in a canonical way based on a novel vertex numbering scheme that we
call the sibling-first recursive numbering. This numbering scheme is essentially a
hybrid between the well-known breadth-first and depth-first numbering schemes,
but differs from both in a way that appears to be more useful for visualizing
control-flow graphs. In particular, as we show in some case studies, this approach
tends to highlight areas in software where code is repeated and it also allows us
to provide visual highlights of code that is contained in deeply nested loops. We
designed J-Viz with the following goals in mind:
– We want users to be easily able to recognize patterns in source code from
our visualizations. Thus, similar sections of code should produce similar
subgraphs, which should be drawn in a similar way.
– We want to use a hierarchical visualization, in which users can collapse or
expand sections of the graph to different levels of detail. But we also want
them to be able to build a consistent mental model of the graph. Thus,
drawings should not drastically shift the relative positions of the vertices
when sections are collapsed or expanded.
– No matter what sequence of actions the user performs, drawings should be
consistent. That is, the same view of a graph, in which the same set of nodes
are collapsed and expanded, should always be drawn in the same way.
– Our system should rank sections of the graph by how likely they are to
produce vulnerabilities, and display this information visually to the user.
We believe that J-Viz makes substantial progress in achieving these goals, and
we provide several case studies in this paper that support this conclusion.
Related Work. Although it is using different means to achieve mental map
preservation, the J-Viz system follows in a long line of research on techniques
directed at preserving the mental map of a graph drawn dynamically. For in-
stance, Misue et al. [20] discuss node movement adjustments, including avoiding
node overlaps, for preserving the mental map. Diehl and Carsten [7] discuss
force-directed approaches for preserving the mental map between instances
of a changing graph. Goodrich and Pszona [12] study efficient algorithms
for minimizing vertex movements as a graph is incrementally revealed in an
online manner. With respect to existing software systems, the Graphviz [8]
and GraphAEL [9] systems both include algorithms intended to preserve the
mental map as a graph is modified. Bridgeman and Tamassia [3] formally study
metrics for characterizing mental map preservation between different instances
of a changing graph. So as to provide an empirical basis for such work, a user
study of Purchase et al. [21] supports the thesis that preserving the mental map
for graph visualization is a useful goal to aid users in performing tasks on graphs.
Visualization tools have also previously been applied to source code. Doxy-
gen [14], a tool for automatically generating documentation, can produce
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various kinds of diagrams for visualizing code, including call graphs. It is
generally configured to use the dot [11] tool from GraphViz to draw these
graphs hierarchically. Similarly, Visual Studio can visualize call graphs to aid
programmers in debugging applications [6]. In constrast with these systems, our
J-Viz tool provides four main features that these tools do not provide. First, J-
Viz shows a greater level of detail, since it analyzes code at the level of individual
instructions rather than methods. Second, J-Viz allows the user to interact with
a graph and produce multiple views of the same Java bytecode. Third, the layout
algorithm used in J-Viz is designed to draw similar code fragments in the same
(canonical) way, so as to highlight portions of repeated code. Fourth, J-Viz
guides the user to potential security vulnerabilities, by highlighting nodes that
are believed to be risky based on algorithmic complexity (or other factors),
whereas these other systems were not focused on software security.
Another tool, Jinsight [5], can be used to profile a Java program to provide
various views of resource usage, such as highlighting which instances of a class
have taken the most time or used the most memory. This tool does not provide a
full graph of the program’s possible execution paths, however, which we believe
to be essential for detecting security vulnerabilities.
2 Graph Generation via Static Analysis
In this section, we review the process that takes Java bytecode as input and
produces the graphs that are visualized in J-Viz. These graphs are produced
using the JVM abstracting abstract machine (Jaam) tool [4] developed at the
University of Utah based on the work of Van Horn and Might [17], which itself
is based on control-flow analysis (CFA) framework known as k-CFA [18, 22].
Because there could be exponentially many possible execution paths of any
given program, which would be too large to visualize and reason about, the
k-CFA framework compresses execution paths into a graph of reasonable size
that represents possible executions of a Java program at the instruction level.
Such a graph is called sound if it represents every possible execution path, and
precise if it excludes every impossible execution path. The k-CFA framework is
sound, and it has a tunable degree of precision based on the integer parameter,
k, albeit at the cost of creating additional states in the graph for larger values
of k.
At the lowest level of the hierarchy, 0-CFA, we discard contextual information
and generate one state, which forms a vertex in the graph representation, for
each line of Java bytecode. Then we add edges for every possible state that could
be reached from a given state. For example, a return statement will have an edge
to every place from which our current method could have been called. At the
next level, 1-CFA, each state also tracks the location from which its method was
called. (See Fig. 12 in Appendix B for example graphs produced by 1-CFA.)
This easily generalizes to higher levels, so that for k-CFA, each state stores
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the locations of the previous k function calls. This added information allows
many of the spurious branches produced by 0-CFA to be pruned. (For additional
information, please see more detailed descriptions of k-CFA [17,18,22].)
0-CFA is known to take O(n3) time to construct a graph for a program with
n lines of code, and this is believed to be tight [15]. k-CFA is EXPTIME-
complete for functional languages [16], but can be solved in polynomial time for
object-oriented languages [19]. Thus, to provide a reasonable balance between
soundness, precision, and efficiency, the version of the Jaam static analyzer used
for the work of this paper is based on 1-CFA. To summarize, then, the Jaam
static analyzer takes as input Java bytecode for a given program and produces
an directed graph, G, that represents the results of a 1-CFA performed on this
bytecode. This graph is ordered, in the sense that the outgoing edges for each
node are sorted according to the order in which the corresponding instructions
appear in the Java bytecode.
3 Our Sibling-First Recursive Layout Algorithm
Our approach to the layout of graphs produced by the Jaam tool [4] is based on
what we believe is a novel graph numbering scheme, which we call a sibling-first
recursive (SFR) numbering. Intuitively, SFR is a hybrid numbering scheme that
combines features of a breadth-first search (BFS) numbering and a depth-first
search (DFS) numbering. We show in Figure 1 the difference between algorithms
for doing a depth-first search (DFS) ordering of a directed graph and a sibling-
first recursive (SFR) numbering. See also Figures 7, 8, and 11 in the appendix,
which illustrate SFR spanning trees and their differences with DFS and BFS
spanning trees.
Algorithm DFS(v):
Number v as vertex n
Increment n
for each directed edge (v, w) do
if w is not numbered then
Identify w as a child of v
DFS(w)
Algorithm SFR(v):
for each directed edge (v, w) do
if w is not numbered then
Identify w as a child of v
Number w as vertex n
Increment n
for each directed edge (v, w) do
if w is a child of v then
SFR(w)
Fig. 1. DFS and SFR algorithms to explore the connected component of a vertex, v, in
a directed graph, G. We assume there is a global variable, n, which is used to number
the vertices. In the case of DFS, we initialize n = 1 and call DFS(v) on a vertex v that
is to become the root of the DFS tree. In the case of SFR, we initialize a vertex, v, as
the root of the SFR tree, numbering it as vertex 1, and we set n = 2 and call SFR(v).
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Our motivation for using the SFR numbering is that we feel it produces a rooted
spanning tree that corresponds more intuitively with the way that programmers
conceptualize the main “backbone” of the control flow of their software. For
example, it places the true-false branches of if statements as children of the
condition that branches to them. In addition, it places the multiple branches of a
switch statement as children of the condition that branches to them, even if some
of the branches flow-through to other branches. (E.g., see Fig. 2.) Furthermore
SFR numbering also enables the viewer to visually identify isomorphic subgraphs
of the graph, corresponding to identical, repeated or equivalent lines of code; see
Fig. 9 in Appendix A.
High-Level Description of Our Layout Algorithm. At a high level, there
are five steps in our algorithm for producing a drawing of the graph, G:
1. We construct an SFR numbering and rooted spanning tree, T , for our input
graph, G, which will be used as the “backbone” of our drawing.
2. We draw the tree T using a recursive placement algorithm.
3. We add the edges of G that are not in the tree T .
4. We highlight in our drawing the sections of our graph that are most likely
to contain vulnerabilities, based on various criteria.
5. We automatically group subsets of nodes before displaying the entire graph
to the user, in a way that allows the user to expand such collapsed nodes.
In the remainder of this section, we describe in more detail each of the above
steps in our layout algorithm.
Constructing an SFR search tree. In our first step, we construct a rooted
(ordered) SFR spanning tree, T , for the graph, G, produced from the Jaam
tool [4]. The algorithm we use to perform this construction is exactly the SFR
algorithm shown in Fig. 1, with the added detail that as we traverse the graph
G to construct our SFR search tree, T , we process the out-edges from each
vertex using the ordering for G, consistent with the intuitive way programmers
naturally organize branches for different types of software branch points. As
we highlight in one of our case studies, this approach tends to produce almost
identical drawings for repeated (e.g., cut-and-pasted) software code fragments.
It also produces ordered combinatorial layouts for each of the following types of
code constructs, as shown in Fig. 2.
– If-else conditional statement: the true and false components are siblings, with
the true component coming first.
– Switch conditional statement: the different branches of the switch statement
are siblings of the conditional statement, ordered by their appearance in
the code (even if there are non-tree edges between them that would be
representing flow-throughs from one branch to another).
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– While/for loop: the end-of-loop statement and loop body are both siblings
of the conditional statement, with the end-of-loop statement coming first.
– Do-while loop: the start statement, loop body, and conditional statements
are in a single path, with a non-tree edge leading back to the start statement.
if cond goto ...
statement statement
true false statement1 statement2 statement3
switch cond
goto ...
(a) (b)
if cond goto ...
end of loop
loop body
loop body
loop start
if cond
goto...
(c) (d)
Fig. 2. Sample graph layout for (a) if-else conditional statement, (b) switch statement
(dashed edges for flow through statements), (c) for and while loop, (d) do-while loop.
Drawing the Nodes of our SFR Search Tree. Once we have constructed
our (ordered) SFR search tree, T , we draw it recursively, starting from the leaves
of T . Each parent is drawn on a row above all of its children. Chains of nodes
are drawn in a vertical column. When we reach a branch point, we lay out each
of the subtrees from left to right. We require that only a direct descendant of
a node can be placed directly underneath it. This means that each subtree, no
matter its size, will have an entire vertical lane reserved for it from top to bottom
in our graph. See Fig. 3.
This requirement might at first seem to waste space in our drawing, but it
maintains consistency when a user expands or collapses connected sections of
nodes. To see why this is so, suppose that two nodes are placed at the same
x-coordinate, but neither is an ancestor of the other. Suppose further that the
user then chooses to collapse the set consisting of the path from each of these
nodes up to their lowest common ancestor. If this happens, then if we simply
shift up that portion of the spanning tree, then we wil cause overlaps, which
would require shift of nodes to fix. (See Fig. 4.) But such a shift would be
moving nodes in a way that could be detrimental to the mental map. Thus,
rather than produce a compact drawing that reuses vertical space, we use the
scheme described above, which tends to preserve the mental map even as we
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would be collapsing or expanding paths in the spanning tree, T , and shifting the
remaining portions accordingly.
Drawing Edges. After we have placed the nodes of our ordered spanning tree,
T , we must draw all of the edges in our graph. In our case we choose to draw
downward edges as straight line segments, and we then draw upward edges as
curved segments. In addition to drawing arrows at the ends of such segments,
this convention provides a visual cue for which direction an edge is pointing. It
also prevents upward edges from lying on top of downward edges. For example,
this makes the drawing of the graph of software implementing the bubblesort
algorithm, shown in Fig. 10 in Appendix B, more readable.
Highlighting. After the nodes and edges of the graph, G, are placed, we
highlight vertices to guide the user on where to begin examining it to discover
possible security vulnerabilities. For attacks based on increasing the running time
for the software on certain inputs, we want to highlight nodes that are likely to
be visited the greatest number of times during an execution. So we color our
Fig. 3. A tree drawn according to our algorithm. The dashed vertical lines show
separation of subtrees into unique lanes.
a
b
a, b
Fig. 4. An example of how breaking our drawing style can cause problems. When
the user collapses nodes a and b, some of the nodes need to be shifted. To avoid
this problem, we forbid a node from lying directly above a node that is not a direct
descendant.
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states from green to red based on how likely each node is to be involved in a
vulnerability. There are several ways to determine such a vulnerability ranking.
We have considered the following three:
– We could perform a recurrence analysis that computes an upper bound on
how many times each node is visited. Automated recurrence analysis has
progressed to the point of being able to provide strong upper bounds on
many simple algorithms [1]. But we do not believe that this is yet possible
for programs such as the ones we need to examine, which contain thousands
or tens of thousands of lines of code, and have a complex loop structure.
– We could profile our code, by providing a sample input and counting how
many times each state is visited. But while this may help for honestly written
programs, we believe it is unlikely to identify the kinds of deliberate attacks
that we need to discover. The programs we are given should in most cases
perform well, because otherwise they would not be used at all. But some
may have a hidden trigger that causes them to run for much longer.
– We could count the number of nested loops that contain each node. This is a
somewhat naive method, but it does seem to give a reasonable heuristic, as
will be seen in our case studies. It is also feasible to compute even for very
large graphs. Hence this is the method that we choose to use.
In order to do this highlighting, of course, we need to determine for each node its
level of nesting with respect to the loops of the program. We use an adaptation
to the SFR tree of a definition by Havlak [13] for DFS trees:
– The outermost loops are the maximal strongly connected components of the
directed control-flow graph, G.
– The header for a loop is the first node in the loop that is reached in the SFR
tree, T .
– The inner loops are the maximal strongly connected components that remain
when the header is removed.
A graph is said to be reducible if every cycle has a single entry point [13]. If
the graph is reducible, then the loop decomposition does not depend on which
rooted spanning is used. But if a cycle has multiple entry points, then the order
in which we explore the branches could matter. Thus, in our case, we use the
canonical SFR tree, T , that has already been defined for our graph.
To compute loop headers efficiently, we use an algorithm from Tao et al. [23].
This traverses the ordered spanning tree and passes loop header information
up the tree. While their method could take a long time for artificially complex
graphs, it takes linear time for most real-world programs, because the spanning
trees for such graphs tend to be reducable or “nearly” reducible.
Grouping Nodes. We have included four different ways in which nodes in the
graph, G can be aggregated, and we present the initial drawing of G to the
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user based on a pre-defined grouping of certain nodes, with some of these pre-
collapsed. First, we choose not to explore nodes that correspond to calls to the
Java library, since we do not expect it to contain vulnerabilities. Instead, every
such call is collapsed to a single line. This prevents us from creating hundreds of
thousands of nodes for the Java library. Nevertheless, the static analyzer, Jaam,
needs to do this carefully, so that it can approximate the state of Java library
objects and predict their later behavior. For example, any object that is added
to an ArrayList or a HashMap can later be taken out. Still, we assume that
such an identification is given as an annotation to the input graph, G, since this
identification is solely the domain of the Jaam tool. Second, we automatically
group each connected set of nodes that belong to the same method. That way,
if the user is not interested in the details of a given method, they can collapse
it to a single node. Third, we automatically group chains of method nodes that
were created in the previous step. Generally, having long chains of nodes taking
up a large portion of the screen space hinders the user from seeing the branching
structure that they need to find. Finally, we allow the user to select a connected
set of nodes and collapse them dynamically, along with providing a comment
explaining the purpose of the corresponding section of code.
4 The User Interface
In constructing the user interface for the J-Viz system, we relied in part on a
survey study of Basil and Keller [2] for software visualizations. They found that
the following criteria were considered “absolutely essential” by a majority of
participants:
• Search tools for graphical and/or textual elements
• Source code visualization
• Hierarchical representations
• Use of colors
• Source code browsing
• Navigation across hierarchies
• Easy access from the symbol list of the corresponding source code.
To make our system more user-friendly, we have implemented each of these
features. We have already discussed our hierarchy for collapsing and expanding
vertices, and our use of colors for highlighting nested loops in our graph. We
show the other features in use in the screenshot shown in Fig. 13 in Appendix C,
and describe each of them below.
Searching. We have included the following searching capabilities in our graph:
• Find nodes by SFR numbering
• Find incoming and outgoing edges for a given node
• Find nodes whose methods contain a given string
• Find nodes whose instructions contain a given string
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Context panel. When nodes are selected by the user, the code for their
methods are shown in the left panel, with the lines for each node highlighted.
Alternatively, a user can select lines from the left panel, and we highlight the
nodes in our graph that correspond to those lines of code. The lines of code for
the innermost loops inside each method are also highlighted.
Description panel. The right panel displays detailed descriptions for each of
the selected nodes in our graph.
Minimap. A minimap is given in the lower left that always shows our full
graph. When we zoom in on part of the graph, it is highlighted on the map, so
that the user never loses track of where they are.
5 Case Studies
In this section, we describe some case studies we performed to test the effective-
ness of the J-Viz system for visualizing Java bytecode and identifying security
vulnerabilities that could be triggered by algorithmic complexity attacks. As
input to these case studies, we were provided by DARPA with programs to
analyze to test our system, some of which were produced by a “red team” tasked
with deliberately creating software that contains vulnerabilities to algorithmic
complexity attacks.
Our first case study is for a program for verifying a password, which is meant
to be kept secret, and not revealing any information about such a password,
including whether it is valid or not. In this case, J-Viz was effective in leading
a security analyst to a nested loop that checks each character in the password
one at a time. In part, because of the way that the SFR spanning tree lays
out conditional branches in an intuitive manner and draws loop edges as curved
segments, the analyst was able to notice that the password-checking program
exits as soon as it finds the first character that does not match. (See Fig. 14
in Appendix C.) The analyst then correctly identified this as a vulnerability
(inserted by the red team), since, by timing multiple executions of the program,
an attacker can easily determine how many correct characters of a password that
they entered with each attempt. Thus, such an attacker could quickly crack the
password by a simple iterative search.
Our second case study is for a program for analyzing and classifying images
based on features, such as the number of edges or the amount of each color
that is present. This program is around 1,000 lines of Java code, and produces
about 3,000 nodes in our graph. The goal of the security analyst in this case
was to determine if this program can be made to take much longer than it
should (specifically, greater than 18 minutes to analyze a 70 KB image). For
most images of that size, the program takes around 6 minutes. But, through the
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use of J-Viz, a security analyst was able to create an image that would take over
an hour to be analyzed. The key insight for the analyst was to pay attention
to the highlighting in our visualizer, which showed the deepest nested loops in
dark red. (See Fig. 5.)
Fig. 5. Our visualization for the graph for an image processor program, showing the
red section of a deeply nested loop (which contained a security vulnerability) in the
bottom right.
In this case, the analyst noticed that many of these nodes were part of
the Mathematics class, which provided custom implementations of various
mathematical functions. In particular, the exponential function was implemented
using a Taylor series, with the number of terms depending on a function of the
RGB value of each pixel. This function was highly non-linear and contained a
“spike,” which is shown in Figure 6, which implied a large number of terms
in the Taylor series for an image having a particular RGB value. Given this
information, the analyst was then able to create an image that triggered this
behavior for every pixel, which took over an hour to process, confirming the
vulnerability.
In addition to these case studies, we show additional examples and screenshots
in Appendix B and C.
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Fig. 6. The time complexity of image processor spikes by two orders of magnitude
when the sum of the RGB values is exactly 30.
6 Conclusion and Future work
We have described a new software visualization tool, J-Viz, that uses an SFR
numbering scheme for graphs produced using the 1-CFA framework so that
similar sections of code should be drawn similarly and deeply nested code
portions are placed well and highlighted.
In keeping with recent graph drawing research, we have argued that our system
preserves the mental map of the user as they interact with the graph. We also
meet all of the criteria that both programmers and researchers have considered
essential for software visualization. As a result, our system has already proven to
be useful for human analysts in finding various kinds of software vulnerabilities.
In future work, we plan to test our system for larger programs. We also plan
to study ways to provide semi-automated methods for identifying other kinds
of potential algorithmic-complexity security vulnerabilities rather than simply
counting the number of nested loops.
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A SFR Numbering and Isomorphic Subgraphs
Fig. 7 illustrates a graph (for the complete code of a bubblesort implementation)
where the vertices are labeled with their SFR numbers.
Fig. 7. A graph for the bubblesort algorithm; vertices are labeled with SFR numbers.
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Fig. 8 illustrates the difference in the spanning trees and the vertex numberings
obtained in our SFR search, and a more conventional depth-first search. Both the
trees and vertex numbering is for a code segment containing switch statement.
The tree and the numbering obtained in the SFR shows the structure of the
switch statement more naturally.
(a)
(b) (c)
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d
e
f
g
h
i
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
switch
1:
stmt2;
stmt1;
a :
b :
c :
2:
stmt4;
stmt3;d :
e :
3:
stmt6;
stmt5;f :
g :
default:
stmt8;
stmt7;h :
i :
(expr)
case
case
case
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
Fig. 8. (a) A code segment containing a switch statement, (b) the spanning tree (thick
edges) and vertex numbering (in blue color) for the graph obtained from SFR search,
and (c) the spanning tree (thick edges) and vertex numbering (in red color) for the
graph obtained from depth-first search.
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The SFR search tree and the SFR numbering also enables viewers to visually
identify isomorphic subgraphs in the graph, which correspond to identical or
equivalent lines of code in the program; see Fig. 9.
Fig. 9. Visually separable isomorphic subgraphs in the graph for the password checker
code; these isomorphic subgraphs correspond to the same or equivalent lines of code.
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B Additional Figures and Examples
In this we show the graphs for some simple algorithms, as visualized in our
J-viz. In particular we show the graphs for a bubblesort algorithm, for two
simple programs implementing the recursive functions computing the factorial
of a number and the n-th Fibonacci number, respectively.
Bubblesort Algorithm
Fig. 10. This partial graph of a bubblesort algorithm shows how drawing upward edges
as curves and highlighting nested loops can improve readability. It also shows our use
of colors for different levels of nested loops.
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Computation of Factorial(n)
Fig. 11. A graph of a recursive factorial function using 1-CFA. The highlighted
instruction occurs twice - once in the context of being called from main, and once
in the context of the factorial function calling itself. Note, in addition, how this tree is
different from a breadth-first search (BFS) tree. Namely, there is a long forward edge
from the rightmost node in the drawing. In a BFS numbering of this graph, that edge
would force its end-vertex to a higher level, which would distort the natural notion of
recursive depth that the SFR spanning tree illustrates better here.
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Computation of the n-th Fibonacci Number
Fig. 12. A graph of a recursive Fibonacci function using 1-CFA. The highlighted
instruction occurs three times, because the function can be called from main, or from
itself in two different places.
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C Illustration of the J-Viz System
Fig. 13 illustrates our J-viz system and its different component.
Fig. 13. A screenshot of our complete visualization system, J-Viz, with a (clipped)
view of an example Factorial program. This shows the left panel with the code for the
currently selected method, the right area with the description of each selected node,
and the minimap with our current zoom level.
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Fig. 14 illustrates how the J-viz system is used in indentifying vulnerable code
segments in a password checker program.
Fig. 14. Our layout of the graph for a password checker with the relevant part zoomed,
as a part of our first case study. The highlighted node shows a check for each character
of a password. If this fails, the program exits the loop immediately, allowing for a
side-channel attack (for identifying failed passwords).
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